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Abstract
We investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act on the cost of debt through its
e¤ect on the reliability of nancial reporting. Using Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads and a
structural CDS pricing model, we calibrate a rm-level corporate opacity parameter in the pre-
and post-SOX periods. Our analysis shows that corporate opacity and the cost of debt decrease
signicantly after SOX. The median rm in our sample experiences an 18 bp reduction on its ve-
year CDS spread as a result of lower opacity following SOX, amounting to total annual savings of
$ 844 million for the 252 rms in our sample. Furthermore, the reduction in opacity tends to be
larger for rms that in the pre-SOX period have lower accrual quality, less conservative earnings,
lower number of independent directors, lower S&P Transparency and Disclosure ratings, and are
more likely to benet from SOX-compliance according to Chhaochharia and Grinsteins (2007)
criteria.
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1 Introduction
The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in July 2002 is arguably one of the most signicant
regulatory events in the recent history of US capital markets. Advocates of the Act claim that its
main objective was to rebuild public trust in US capital markets after a series of accounting
scandals (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Jorion, Shi, and Zhang, 2009; Healy and Palepu, 2003). To
that end, the Act contains several mandates aiming to increase corporate transparency through
more reliable corporate reporting. According to Coates (2007), the two core components of such
mandates are the creation of a quasi-public institution to supervise auditors, and the enlisting of
auditors to enforce new disclosure rules giving rms incentives to tighten nancial controls.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes both direct and indirect costs on public rms. Direct out-of-pocket
costs include internal compliance costs and increased audit fees (Iliev, 2010), while indirect costs
arise from sub-optimal disclosure under tighter constraints compared to laxer ones (Verrechhia,
1983). The indirect costs of excessive disclosure may include competitive disadvantages in product
markets; bargaining disadvantages with customers, suppliers, and employees; and increased risk
exposure of top o¢ cers resulting in risk avoiding behavior (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2007; Bargeron,
Lehn, and Zutter, 2010; Kang, Liu, and Qi, 2010). The benets of the new legislation, if any, are
still under debate1.
In this paper we focus on an aspect of SOX that has received little attention: the e¤ect of the Act
on the cost of debt capital due to presumably higher reliability of corporate reporting. Admittedly,
we do not provide a full cost-benet analysis of the Act. Instead we attempt to shed light on a
particular e¤ect of the legislation that is arguably hard to measure. Our results show a median
decrease in the cost of debt of 17:7 basis points per year for our sample rms due to an increase
in corporate transparency as perceived by investors. This e¤ect is economically large considering
that the risk-free rate and the median credit spread were respectively 330 and 111 basis points in
the period immediately after the passage of the Act. In dollar terms, the perceived improvement
in the quality of nancial reporting translates into total savings of US$ 843 million per year for the
252 rms in our sample. Consistent with previous studies, our evidence indicates that the e¤ect
of the Act depends on rmspredictable characteristics (Akhigbe and Martin, 2006; Chhaochharia
and Grinstein, 2007; Zhang, 2008). Specically, the reduction in opacity perceived by investors
following SOX is larger for rms that are less transparent according to the 2002 S&P Transparency
and Disclosure Index, have lower earnings quality in the pre-SOX period, have a lower number of
1See Akhigbe and Martin (2006), Akhigbe and Martin (2008), Bushee and Leuz (2005), Chhaochharia and Grin-
stein (2007), Zhang (2007), Leuz (2007), Iliev (2010), Hostak et al. (2009), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008), for analyses
of the economic consequences of SOX.
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independent directors, and are more likely to be a¤ected by SOX according to the criteria used in
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007).
Perhaps the large e¤ect of SOX on credit spreads we document is not surprising: recent research
underscores the importance of corporate transparency for the pricing of debt-related contracts.
Du¢ e and Lando (2001) develop a model showing that corporations with less reliable nancial
reports have higher secondary market credit spreads due to the asymmetric nature of cash ows
from debt contracts. This occurs even when investors are risk-neutral and symmetrically informed.
The Du¢ e-Lando model is able to generate non-negligible short-term credit spreads for investment
grade corporations, a robust empirical phenomenon that is hard to explain in a full information
framework. Empirical research by Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004), Ball, Robin, and Sadka
(2008), Duarte, Young, and Yu (2008), Lu, Chen, and Liao (2010), Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller
(2004), Sengupta (1998), Wittenberg-Moerman (2008), Yu (2005), and Zhang (2008) corroborates
the importance of corporate transparency for debt pricing.
A contemporaneous and independent paper by DeFond, Hung, Karaoglu, and Zhang (2011) also
studies the impact of SOX on debt prices. Using cumulative "abnormal" changes in corporate bond
spreads over 13 short-term windows surrounding events leading up to the passage of SOX, they
conclude that the Act increased the cost of debt by 20 basis points. Our work di¤ers from theirs
in at least three important ways. First, in the same spirit of Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007),
we use long pre- and post-SOX windows rather than price changes over a few days around selected
pre-enactment events2. Second, our analysis relies on CDS spreads, not corporate bond prices.
The secondary market for corporate bonds is less liquid, with larger bidask spreads than the CDS
market, which may pose a challenge for event spreads study analyses, particularly those with short
event windows such as DeFond et al. (2011)3. Third, we rely on spread levels and a structural
pricing model to calibrate rm-period specic opacity parameters, and use the latter to evaluate
the e¤ect of SOX on the cost of debt through its e¤ect on the reliability of corporate reports4. In
contrast, DeFond et al. use OLS regressions to detect "abnormal" changes in spreads. In the next
section we argue that non-linearities, interaction terms, and endogeneity cast doubt on the use of
OLS regressions to address the e¤ect of SOX on credit spreads.
2Both Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and Zhang (2007) study the e¤ect of SOX on rm value. Using
short-term event windows surrounding events leading up to the passage of SOX, Zhang (2007) concludes that, in
value-weighted aggregation, SOX reduced rmsvalue. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) use long term windows
and reach the opposite conclusion.
3Ait-Sahalia, Mykland and Zhang (2005) show that in markets whose prices are a¤ected by microstructure noise,
short-window price variations are more a¤ected by noise than longer-window price variations.
4Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari (2008) propose a measure of accounting quality based on the goodness-of-t of a
model of credit rating changes as a function of lagged earnings. In contrast, our opacity parameter is calibrated from
the levels of CDS spreads and current market and accounting information.
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The e¤ect of SOX on the cost of debt capital is related to additional areas of the literature.
Several studies examine the cost of debt and how it relates to corporate governance. Studies that
examine board characteristics, structures, and provisions include: Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb
(2004), Bradley and Chen (2010), Chen (2012), and Fields, Fraser, and Subrahmanyam (2012).
Other studies that examine the impact of governance on debt prices include Klock, Mansi, and
Maxwell (2005) and Boubakri and Ghouma (2010).
It is di¢ cult to capture every factor that drives credit spreads.5 Therefore, we explore several
alternative explanations that could impact our analysis. The two main factors that may impact
our analysis and are not directly captured in the model are changes in systematic risk and changes
in liquidity over time. Since prices of risk in the credit market may change over our sample period,
we control for known systematic risk factors in our robustness check. We provide evidence that the
reduction in opacity after SOX is not due to changes in risk premia. Perhaps a more important
issue is the rapid expansion of the CDS market over time. The number of dealers and gross notional
dollar volume expanded during our sample period. If a liquidity premium priced in the level of
CDS spreads declined post-SOX, it could inuence our measure of opacity. We provide evidence
that the increase in dealer activity does not explain the reduction in opacity post-SOX.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we describe our methodology and data,
and develop three hypotheses whose empirical tests are reported in Section 3. In this section, we
also estimate the e¤ect of SOX due to increased reliability of corporate nancial reporting, the
main goal of the paper. In Section 4, we show that our results are robust to plausible alternative
explanations of our main ndings and to sensible variations in our calibration procedure. Section
5 concludes the paper.
5As one anonymous referee pointed out to us, the ideal experiment would be to compare the CDS of rms a¤ected
and not-a¤ected by SOX around the passage of SOX. One candidate control sample for this di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach would be foreign rms. However, foreign rms cross-listed in the US are also subject to SOX. Therefore,
the control sample would contain non-cross listed foreign rms only. Unfortunately, as of 2002, the overwhelming
majority of non-US rms with CDS trading were in fact cross-listed in the US. For example, among the 311 European
rms with 5-year CDS quotes available in the Markit database prior to SOX, we veried that 292 of them were
cross-listed in the US. Of the 19 (311-292) non-cross-listed rms, 5 are nancial rms, excluded from our analysis.
Therefore, the potential control group of non-cross-listed, non-nancial rms contains just 14 rms. This sample is
too small for a meaningful di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach.
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2 Methodology, Data, and Testable Hypotheses
We measure the cost of debt using credit spreads from Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts. A
CDS is an over-the-counter insurance contract on debt. The buyer and seller of insurance agree on
a reference corporate bond and on a notional value for the contract; for example, US$ 10 million.
The buyer of insurance pays the quoted spread times $10 million to the seller of insurance, typically
on a quarterly basis, and obtains the right to sell bonds with a face value of $10 million, at their
face value, to the seller of insurance in the event of corporate default.
CDS and corporate bond spreads are closely related theoretically and empirically (Du¢ e, 1999;
Blanco et al., 2005). However, there are several advantages in using CDS rather than bond spreads
in our research. First, CDS spreads are quoted directly, as opposed to bond spreads that depend on
the arbitrary choice of a default-free term structure of interest rates. Second, traded CDS spreads
have a xed maturity, so it is not necessary to control for changes in time to maturity. Third,
the CDS market has become much more liquid than the secondary market for corporate bonds;
therefore, CDS market prices are in principle more reliable (Hull et al., 2004; Blanco et al., 2005).
Finally, in contrast to corporate bonds, there is no reason to believe that illiquidity in the CDS
market a¤ects the average level of a rms CDS spread because a CDS is a derivative contract, not
an asset (Longsta¤ et al., 2005).
2.1 CDS pricing model
Corporate transparency is only one of several determinants of credit spreads. In order to measure
the change in spreads due to a change in corporate reporting reliability, we need to control for
changes in the other spread determinants. Controlling for other spread determinants using OLS
regressions could lead to misspecication because of non-linearities and interaction terms, and
because of an important endogeneity issue.
First, structural debt pricing models indicate that the derivative of credit spreads with respect to
a given spread determinant depends crucially on the level of that factor and of other factors. In
other words, the impact of credit spread determinants is highly non-linear and includes important
interactions among the factors. Empirical research by Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) conrms that
non-linearities and interactions are economically signicant. The authors show that the sensitivity
of credit spreads to leverage is much higher at high spread levels than at low spread levels. Therefore,
regressions of credit spreads would have to group rms by spread levels at the minimum. Ideally,
the regression specication would include numerous powers and cross-products of the explanatory
variables.
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Second, rms with less reliable corporate reporting, recognizing that they are charged relatively
high interest rates, may choose to take on less debt. Therefore, if corporate opacity is imperfectly
measured with existing proxies, OLS regressions of credit spreads on leverage and other explanatory
variables yield biased and inconsistent coe¢ cient estimates because the residual is correlated with
explanatory variables. Research by Molina (2005) indicates that the endogeneity of leverage is more
than a mere technicality: accounting for it increases the e¤ect of leverage on default probabilities by
a factor of three6. Analogously, the endogeneity of leverage should matter for the relation between
credit spreads and leverage.
We address these empirical di¢ culties by using a structural debt pricing model that explicitly
incorporates the e¤ect of accounting reliability, along with all the other credit spread determinants.
We rely on the CreditGrades model, which delivers a simple, analytical debt pricing formula. The
model was jointly developed by Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and Deutsche Bank and is a popular
debt pricing tool among practitioners. According to Currie and Morris (2002), the CreditGrades
model was the industry standard CDS pricing model as of 2002. Attesting to the popularity of
the model, Yu (2006) and Duarte, Longsta¤, and Yu (2007) use the CreditGrades model in recent
research.
In contrast to models of debt pricing under full information, the CreditGrades model explicitly
incorporates a parameter representing uncertainty about the true level of a rms liabilities. The
logic underlying this extension is that the level of liabilities reported on the rms balance sheet
is potentially di¤erent from the level of liabilities that will drive a corporation to default. We
refer to this uncertainty parameter as "corporate opacity." Our research strategy is to calibrate
this parameter for each rm in the pre- and post-SOX periods by minimizing the sum of squared
di¤erences between market and model-implied prices. By using rm-level changes in calibrated
corporate opacity in the pre- and post-SOX periods, we control for all of the other credit spread
determinants in the model, taking into account interactions between them and non-linear e¤ects7.
6Molina (2005) attributes the leverage endogeneity problem to imperfect measurement of fundamental risk: equity
or asset volatility would be imperfect proxies of fundamental business risk, therefore OLS regressions that attempt
to control for fundamental risk by adding volatility as an explanatory variable (along with leverage) would yield
biased and inconsistent coe¢ cients. Our point about the imperfect measurement of corporate transparency provides
additional motivation for the leverage endogeneity problem. Molina (2005) uses IV estimation to circumvent the
leverage endogeneity problem, using the history of rmspast market valuations and rmsmarginal tax rates as
instruments for the e¤ect of leverage on default probabilities.
7A similar approach to account for non-linearity and interactions among credit spread determinants is used by
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007). To study the e¤ect of strategic interactions between shareholders and debtholders
on credit spreads, while taking account of other spread determinants, the authors compute the di¤erence between
actual spreads and spreads implied by a structural debt pricing model without such strategic interactions. Then they
regress these residuals onto theoretically motivated variables that might explain strategic interactions.
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2.2 CDS pricing formula
The CreditGrades CDS pricing model requires eight inputs: time to expiration T , stock price S;
equity volatility S , recovery rateR, risk-free rate r, reported liabilities per equity shareD, expected
location of the default boundary as a fraction of liabilities L; and a parameter  representing
uncertainty about the location of the default boundary. Formally,  is the standard deviation of
the log of the default boundary as a fraction of liabilities. We interpret  as a measure of corporate
opacity because when reported liabilities are less reliable there is more uncertainty about the true
level of liabilities that will drive the rm to default. The CreditGrades manual (2002) shows that
the CDS spread can be well approximated by:
c(T ) = r(1 R) 1  q(0) +H(T )
q(0)  q(T )e rT  H(T ) (1)
The function q() is dened as
q(t) = 

 A(t)
2
+
ln(d)
2

  d

 A(t)
2
  ln(d)
A(t)

; (2)
where () is the standard normal c.d.f. and
d =
S + LD
LD
e
2
; A(t) =
p
2t+ 2;  = S
S
S + LD
:
Finally,
H(T ) = er (G(T + ) G()) ; (3)
where
G(t) = dz+
1
2

  ln(d)

p
t
  zpt

+ d z+
1
2

  ln(d)

p
t
+ z
p
t

; (4)
and
 =
2
2
z =
1
4
+
2r
2
: (5)
2.3 Data sources and sample selection
Using daily CDS quotes, we calibrate a corporate opacity parameter  for each rm by minimizing
the sum of squared di¤erences between market CDS spreads and model-implied CDS spreads. We
calibrate separate parameters before and after the enactment of SOX for each rm in the sample.
We dene the pre-SOX period as January 1, 2001 to July 31, 2002, and the post-SOX period as
August 1, 2002 to December 31, 2003. To perform the calibrations, we require each rm in the
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sample to have at least 30 CDS quotes in the pre-SOX period and 30 CDS quotes in the post-SOX
period. We restrict the sample to non-nancial rms and main entities, as opposed to subsidiaries.
Markit Partners provided us with the CDS data8. Markit collects OTC dealer quotes on di¤erent
CDS tenors on a daily basis. Until recently, volume in the CDS market was concentrated in 5-year
contracts. Since we want liquid market quotes in our model calibration, we focus on the 5-year
contract, as do other researchers. Also following the literature, we focus on US dollar denominated
senior unsecured CDS contracts with the modied restructuring clause (e.g. Jorion and Zhang,
2007).
In addition to the corporate opacity parameter , there are seven additional inputs required to
price the CDS as shown by Equations (1) to (6). The time to expiration is xed at T=5 years.
The stock price S is the common stock closing prices from CRSP. Following Hull, Predescu, and
White (2004), the risk-free rate r is the 5-year swap rate minus 10 basis points. Liabilities per share
D is total liabilities minus minority interest and deferred taxes divided by the number of shares
outstanding. Balance sheet information is from COMPUSTAT, based on the most recent annual
statement available to investors at the time the market prices are quoted. The recovery rate R is
from the Markit database, following Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009). Along with CDS quotes, Markit
also collects a daily rm-specic estimate of the recovery value on a defaulted bond referenced by
the CDS contract, provided by the quoting CDS dealers. Equity volatility S is the 5-year forecast
from a GARCH(1,1) model t on the full sample period, following Engles (2001) statement that
GARCH(1,1) is the "simplest and most robust of the family of volatility models."9
The seventh additional input required to price the CDS is the expected default boundary as a
fraction of reported liabilities, L: The CreditGrades Technical Manual (2002) suggests using the
expected default boundary L = 12 for all rms. We do this as a robustness check. In our base
results we choose a di¤erent L for each industry, chosen in order to maximize the total number
of rm-day observations in that industry in which market spreads are within the range of spreads
that can be delivered by the CreditGrades model for all values of . After nding such Ls, we
calibrate  for each rm-period so as to minimize the sum of squared di¤erences between market
and model CDS spreads. Appendix A provides additional details on the CreditGrades model and
its calibration.
8The Markit database starts in January 2001, which limits our exibility to dene the pre-SOX period.
9See pages 471-474 of Hull (2006). When the GARCH(1,1) estimation yields a non-stationary ("mean-eeing")
model, which happens in 25 of the 252 sample rms, we use we use a exponentially smoothed moving average of the
previous 252 days with a smoothing coe¢ cient of 0.94.
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2.4 Data overview
Our sample includes 252 rms after merging the Markit database with CRSP and COMPUSTAT,
excluding nancial rms and subsidiaries, and requiring at least 30 quotes per rm in each period.
Sample rms are large: only 33 were not part of the S&P500 Index at some point in the sample
period. Table 1 contains summary statistics for the spread and its determinants in the pre- and post-
SOX periods. The reported means and standard deviations are cross-sectional summary statistics
based on rm-specic time-series averages of the corresponding variable. In the table, one minus
leverage is the stock price divided by the sum of the stock price and liabilities per share. Spreads
are reported in basis points.
TABLE 1
The mean spread is 119:3  111:2 = 8:1 basis points lower in the post-SOX period. As the Credit-
Grades pricing formula shows, the CDS spread is a complex function of the models eight inputs.
Thus, increased reliability in corporate reporting may not necessarily be the driver of the decrease
in spreads following SOX. Equity volatility and risk-free rates decreased in the post-SOX period
which reduces credit spreads, holding other factors constant. However, average leverage increased
and recovery rates decreased in the post-SOX period which increases spreads, holding other factors
constant. The mean number of time-series observations in the earlier period is lower than in the
post-SOX period, while its standard deviation is higher. This is because the number of rms in
the Markit database has increased over time: not all 252 rms in our sample were part of the
Markit database as of January 1, 2001. Each rm, however, has at least 30 observations in both
the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods.
2.5 Hypotheses
Below we state the three hypotheses whose empirical validity we aim to assess. Throughout,
corporate opacity refers to the uncertainty parameter  calibrated from market prices using the
CDS pricing model described earlier.
Hypothesis 1: Corporate opacity is lower for rms that have higher earnings quality, are perceived
to be more transparent and to have better corporate governance.
This can be seen as external validation of the corporate opacity parameter : The calibrated
parameter presumably measures uncertainty about a rms true leverage as perceived by investors.
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We expect this uncertainty to be inversely related to quantitative measures of earnings quality.
We focus on three measures: accrual quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins,
Kinney, and LaFond, 2008), abnormal accruals (Francis, Nanda, and Olsson, 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife
et al., 2008), and earnings conservativism (Basu, 1997; Zhang, 2008). We also expect our calibrated
opacity parameter to be inversely related to the number of independent directors in the rms Board
(Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2004). Moreover, calibrated opacity should be higher for younger rms
which did not have enough time to build a reputation of reliable reporting, or have not yet "ironed
out the kinks" in their internal control systems (Diamond, 1989; Doyle, Ge and McVay, 2007;
Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2008). In addition to the aforementioned objective measures, we expect
the corporate opacity parameter to be negatively related to measures of corporate transparency
based on expert judgment, such as the publicly available S&P Transparency and Disclosure Ratings
of Pattel and Dallas (2002).
It is important to point out that, for the purposes of this paper, our methodology remains valid
even if the calibrated parameter  is a noisy measure of corporate opacity. Suppose that  is a
catch-all measure a¤ected not only by corporate opacity but also by other factors, such as model
error or a rms attractiveness for leveraged buy-outs. There is no ex ante reason to believe that
model error should systematically change after the passage of SOX. Thus, assuming its impact
is constant in the pre- and post-SOX periods, changes in  need be due to changes in corporate
opacity. Furthermore, leveraged buy-out activity increased substantially following (some would
argue because of) the Act, which would act to increase rather than decrease credit spreads, and
consequently our calibrated opacity parameter in the post-SOX period.
Hypothesis 2: Corporate opacity decreases after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Existing research provides evidence that corporate reporting has become more reliable after SOX
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2008; Dyck et al., 2010; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian,
2009; Singer and You, 2011). Recent surveys conrm research evidence. The majority of 274
nance o¢ cers surveyed by the Financial Executives Research Foundation (2006) believe that SOX
increased investors condence in nancial reports. For large rms with more than $25 billion
revenues, 83% of executives in the survey agree that investors are more condent in reported
numbers as a result of SOX. Furthermore, 82% of audit committee members surveyed by the
Center for Audit Quality (2008) think that audit quality has improved in recent years, while 65%
of committee members believe that investors have more condence in capital markets as a result
of SOX. Given the research and survey evidence, we argue that CDS market participants are less
uncertain about the true level of corporate leverage following the Act. Thus, corporate transparency
as perceived by investors has increased after SOX.
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Hypothesis 3: After the enactment of SOX, corporate opacity decreases more for rms that are
more likely to be a¤ected by the Act.
Firms whose reports are more reliable prior to SOX presumably already have better internal con-
trols, more detailed disclosure, or more reliable auditing before the Act, which makes them less
likely to be a¤ected by the new legislation. Consistent with this notion, Chhaochharia and Grinstein
(2007) show that the net benets of the new legislation are higher for rms that are less compliant
with the Act in the pre-SOX period. By the same logic, if the new regulation does indeed a¤ect
corporate opacity, we expect its impact to vary with rmspre-SOX characteristics. Specically, we
predict that the decrease in opacity should be more pronounced for rms that are less transparent
and have lower earnings quality in the pre-SOX period, and are more likely to be a¤ected by SOX
according to the criteria used by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007).
3 Empirical Analysis
As explained earlier, we calibrate a corporate opacity parameter before and after the enactment of
SOX. We then use this measure to estimate the impact that a change in the reliability of corporate
reporting has had on credit spreads. Figure 1 presents the time-series of the median observed spread
and the median model-implied spread, calculated with the calibrated parameters. Model-implied
spreads are based on rm-specic parameters calibrated separately in the pre-SOX and post-SOX
periods. There is a pronounced decrease in model spreads at the boundary between the pre-SOX
and the post-SOX periods. This is consistent with the idea that the corporate opacity parameter
may have decreased in the post-SOX period for the typical rm in our sample. To determine if
the model-implied spreads decreased due to a decrease in opacity, however, we must control for the
other determinants of credit spreads.
FIGURE 1
There are cases in which the model over predicts spreads even when the opacity parameter  is zero.
This implies that, conditional on the rms asset volatility and leverage, on the recovery value of
debt and on the level of the risk-free rate, model spreads are too high relative to observed spreads.
See Panel B of Table A.1 for additional information on the corner solutions of the calibration
procedure.
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3.1 Testing hypotheses
In this section we discuss the empirical results of testing the three hypotheses presented earlier.
Variable denitions are presented in Table 2.
TABLE 2
3.1.1 Hypothesis 1
Table 3 presents means and medians of the pre-SOX opacity parameter  across rms grouped
by characteristics related to nancial reporting reliability. In each panel, we test the hypotheses
that means and medians of corporate opacity are equal across rms with high and low nancial
reporting reliability. The total number of observations in each grouping is below 252 when the
corresponding characteristic is not available for rms in our sample10. Across all Panels, the break
down between rms with high or low nancial reporting reliability is chosen so that sample sizes
across bins are as similar as possible. Panels (A) through (C) of Table 3 are based on quantitative
measures of earnings quality. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the evidence shows that corporations
with lower accrual quality, higher discretionary accruals, and less conservative earnings tend to
have higher calibrated opacity. Therefore, rms with lower quality earnings tend to have higher
cost of debt, ceteris paribus11. The results in Panels (D) and (E) show that younger rms and rms
with a lower number of independent directors tend to have higher calibrated opacity. Panel (F) is
based on Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Index of June 2002, based on expert
judgment rather than purely quantitative modeling. According to the measure, more transparent
rms tend to have lower corporate opacity.
TABLE 3
10There are 39 rms with virtually identical earnings conservativism, between 0.999 and 1.001. For these rms,
the coe¢ cient on negative returns in the Basu (1997) regression was very close to 0. Since the median of earnings
conservativism in the sample of 252 rms was 1, and these rms are less than 1/1,000 standard deviations apart from
each other, keeping these rms in the sample only adds noise. These rms are dropped from the sample in Tables
3 and 5 (but not in Table 9). Had they been kept in the sample, sorting results would go in the same direction of
those in Tables 3 and 5, but would be less strong statistically due to increased sampling noise.
11Callen, Livnat, and Segal (2009) study the impact of earnings (not the reliability of reported earnings) on CDS
spreads.
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3.1.2 Hypothesis 2
Table 4 Panel A reports statistics on the calibrated opacity parameter  in the pre- and post-SOX
periods. The post-SOX opacity parameters are less than or equal to the pre-SOX parameters on
average and at each quartile. As shown by the scatter plot in Figure 2, most rms in our sample
experience a decrease in the calibrated opacity measure following SOX. The mass of calibrated
parameters that equal zero corresponds to lower-bound solutions in the calibration (see Appendix
A for details). Untabulated results show that the correlation between pre- and post-SOX opacity
parameters is 0:78, while the Spearman rank-correlation is 0:79. The high correlation suggest that
 is associated with a rms intrinsic characteristics, rather than with noise in CDS spreads.
TABLE 4
FIGURE 2
Table 4 Panel B provides a formal test of the hypothesis that pre- and post-SOX corporate opac-
ity are drawn from distributions having the same mean or median. The mean (median) opacity
parameter is 0:656 (0:510) in the pre-SOX period and decreases to 0:450 (0:391) following the en-
actment of SOX, a 31% (23%) reduction. The di¤erences in means and medians across sub-periods
are signicant at the 1% probability level, providing strong statistical support for the hypothesis
that the distribution of the corporate opacity parameter shifts downward after SOX. However, it
is di¢ cult to gauge the economic relevance of this evidence. Although a one quarter decrease in
the opacity parameter appears to be substantial, its economic signicance needs to be assessed in
light of its e¤ect on model-implied CDS spreads. In the next section, we provide a more detailed
discussion of the economic signicance of the evidence discussed here.
3.1.3 Hypothesis 3
Figure 2 shows that, even though most rms experience a decrease in calibrated opacity, there is
substantial cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of the decrease. Our Hypothesis 3 is that
the reduction in the opacity parameter following SOX is larger for rms more likely to be a¤ected
by the new legislation. Table 5 presents evidence consistent with Hypothesis 3. The table reports
mean and median changes in the opacity measure for various subsamples obtained by grouping
rms based on pre-SOX characteristics. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, rms with lower accrual
quality, higher discretionary accruals, and less conservative earnings tend to experience a larger
reduction of calibrated opacity following SOX. Moreover, rms with a lower number of independent
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directors, younger rms, and rms with poorer disclosure quality according to the S&P 2002 rating,
also experience a more pronounced drop in opacity following SOX. Panel (G) is based on criteria
adopted in Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007). The authors argue that rms with incidences of
insider trading, restatements, and related party-transactions in the pre-SOX period should be more
a¤ected by the passage of SOX since these events are typically manifestations of poor governance
structures12. Panel (G) of Table 5 show that such rms (identied by "Yes" in the table) display
larger reductions in corporate opacity . The test statistics in the table suggest that di¤erences in
the mean and median reduction in opacity are unlikely to be due to chance. Untabulated results
show that the larger reduction in opacity for rms agged by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2001)
is not driven by one of the three criteria in particular: the decrease in opacity is larger for rms
grouped according to each of the three criteria.
TABLE 5
3.2 Economic signicance
Our tests indicate that the CDS-calibrated opacity parameter  is related to the corporate report-
ing reliability, and that pre-SOX levels of corporate reliability predict changes in  following SOX.
In this section, we estimate the change in the cost of debt due to increased reliability of corporate
reports following SOX, the main economic question of the paper. Specically, we compute the dif-
ference between model-implied spreads in the post-SOX period using post-SOX calibrated opacity
parameters versus pre-SOX calibrated parameters for each rm-day in our sample. By keeping all
the other seven inputs of the CDS pricing formula unchanged in the post-SOX period, and compar-
ing model-implied spreads calculated with pre-SOX and post-SOX calibrated opacity parameters,
we are able to calculate the change in model-implied spreads that is only due to the reduction of
corporate opacity. The average spread di¤erence across the 87; 663 rm-day observations in the
post-SOX period is  20:8 basis points per year, with a standard error of 3:1 basis points. This
standard error is heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by rm. The median spread di¤erence
is  17:7 basis points per year, with a standard error of 2:6 basis points. This standard error is
bootstrapped with clustering by rm. Given that the median spread in the post-SOX period is 111
basis points, the implied decline in the cost of debt is economically substantial.
To better gauge the economic consequences of the increased transparency perceived by investors
following SOX, we compute the dollar savings that result from the implied decline in the cost of
12We are grateful to Vidhi Chhaoccharia and Yaniv Grinstein for generously providing us with their data. The
data includes a fourth dummy variable, audit services, which was zero for all rms in our sample.
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debt. We obtain from COMPUSTAT the total amount of (interest-bearing) debt for each rm in
our sample throughout the post-SOX period. We then multiply the spread di¤erence for each rm
on each day by the corresponding level of debt and compute the time series median of this annual
dollar saving value for each rm. Taking the cross-sectional median of the time-series median
annual dollar saving value, we estimate that the implied savings related to the cost of debt amount
to $2:75 million per year for the typical rm in our sample. Summing the median dollar savings
across the 252 rms, we estimate that the passage of SOX is associated with a total reduction in
the cost of debt of $844 million per year for our sample rms as a result of enhanced transparency.
4 Robustness checks
We perform two kinds of robustness checks in this section. First, we explore the validity of other
plausible explanations for the results presented earlier. Then, we assess the robustness of our main
ndings to changes in the way we calibrate the CDS pricing model.
4.1 Systematic risk: risk loadings and the price of risk
The CreditGrades model does not accommodate for di¤erences in CDS spreads due to di¤erences
in systematic risk. It is possible that spreads are relatively higher for rms with asset values that
co-vary strongly with the overall state of the economy (e.g. Tang and Yan, 2010). Therefore,
one could argue that the corporate opacity parameter  simply proxies for a premium for bearing
systematic risk. In the cross-section, we explore this possibility by comparing the calibrated s
across subsamples of rms that have di¤erent CAPM betas calculated with equity returns. We also
measure bond systematic risk by calculating the loadings on corporate bond factors used by Fama
and French (1993) and Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005). We measure returns by
calculating CDS-implied corporate bond returns, as in Longsta¤ et al. (2011). The two corporate
bond factors are calculated using Merrill Lynch bond index returns. The rst, TERM, is the
returns of a zero-investment portfolio long in long-term government bonds and short in T-Bills.
The second, DEF (for default), is the return of a zero-investment portfolio long in BBB corporate
bonds and short in AAA corporate bonds. Table 6 contains the results of this analysis.
TABLE 6
The rst two columns of Table 6 report test statistics for equality of means and medians of calibrated
opacity across subsamples of rms having high versus low risk loadings. There are six of such tests,
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encompassing three kinds of risk loadings and the pre- and post-SOX periods. Contrary to the
risk-based explanation of our results, calibrated opacities are negatively related to loadings on the
Market and the DEF risk factors in this sample. We argue that this result is driven by endogenous
leverage: more opaque rms, recognizing that they are charged relatively higher interest rates,
choose to take on less debt. This makes them less prone to su¤er from liquidity shortages during
recessions13.
It turns out that pre-SOX opacities are positively related to loadings in the TERM factor. However,
the evidence is not robust to using medians rather than averages, which suggests that this result
is driven mainly by outliers. Moreover, post-SOX opacities are not positively related to post-SOX
loadings in the TERM factor. Since there is as much cross-sectional variation in the TERM factor
before and after SOX, the nding that opacities are related to loadings on the TERM factor is not
robust. The combined results indicate that, to the extent that loadings on CAPM and Fama-French
bond factors are good proxies for exposure to systematic risk, a systematic risk explanation of our
results does not hold in the cross-section of opacity levels.
The last column of Table 6 examines the possibility that the documented decrease in corporate
opacity is actually picking up the e¤ect of a decrease in the market-wide price of risk. For constant
risk loadings, a decrease in the price of risk would have caused a decrease in systematic risk premia
for all rms, which we would capture in the form of lower opacity parameters. We test a cross-
sectional implication of this explanation: since the risk premium is the product of an asset-specic
risk loading and a market-wide price of risk, this alternative explanation implies that a decrease in
the market-wide price risk should a¤ect more rms with high risk loadings. Therefore, rms with
higher pre-SOX risk loadings would display larger decrease in the opacity parameter. Similar to the
tests in levels of corporate opacity, results for the Market and DEF risk factors do not support the
risk-based explanation. For the TERM risk factor, results are mixed. The mean test shows that
there was indeed a larger reduction in opacity for rms with high loadings in the TERM factors,
but the di¤erence in median opacity between rms with high and low TERM betas is much smaller
than the di¤erence in means, and not statistically signicant at 10%. Assuming that loadings in
the Market, TERM, and DEF factors indeed capture exposure to systematic risk, and that the
price of risk of the TERM factor is not much greater than the prices of risk in the Market and
DEF factors combined14, these results suggest that it is unlikely that a reduction in the price of
13Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2011) make a similar endogenous choice argument to explain their result
that credit spreads are positively associated to cash holdings. They argue that risky rms choose to hold more cash
which reduces the default risk in the short-run, but over the long-run their higher risk is reected in higher credit
spreads.
14Fama and French (1993) conclude that the price of risk of TERM (and DEF) factors is close to zero. Gebhardt
et al (2005) nd that the point estimates of the prices of risk of TERM and DEF are similar, but the DEF factor
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risk story is driving the bulk of our results.
4.2 Liquidity of the CDS market and the introduction of TRACE
The CreditGrades model does not implicitly capture liquidity and microstructure e¤ects that could
inuence the price of default insurance (e.g. Tang and Yan, 2008). The CDS market rapidly
expanded during our sample period and continued to do so until 2007. The International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA) reported that the total amount of credit default swaps outstanding
at the end of 2001 was approximately $800 billion gross notional and climbed to $3.8 trillion by
the end of 2003. The expansion of liquidity in the market could have decreased the average level
of spreads due to a reduction in a liquidity premium. We explore this alternative explanation by
examining the impact of the continued expansion of the CDS market on  after the post-SOX
period ended. The ISDA reports that the total gross notional amount of CDS continued to grow
at a similar percent for the next several years; the market more than doubled in size in 2004 and
2005. We expect the continued growth in liquidity in the market to inuence  in a similar manner
in 2004 and 2005. If liquidity is driving our result, lambda should continue to decline in 2004 and
2005, controlling for other factors. The relative impact of liquidity on CDS spreads is hard to
quantify without a formal model, however we argue that there should be a statistical and economic
di¤erence in the level of  in 2004 and 2005, if liquidity is the driver of our pre- and post-SOX
results.
We observe a rapid increase in the amount of dealers providing quotes in the pre- and post-SOX
periods, consistent with an increase in liquidity in the market during this period. The number
of dealer quotes continued to increase in 2004 and 2005 as well. We use the number of dealers
participating in the market as a proxy for liquidity at each point in time. As the dealer depth
grows, the liquidity premium could decrease the average level of spreads and hence . Table 7
contains statistics that document the impact of dealer depth on . We calibrated  for all rms
with enough data in 2004 and 2005 and tabulated the mean and median level of opacity relative to
changes in dealer depth. In Panel A of Table 7, we merge all rms in the pre-SOX, post-SOX, 2004,
and 2005 periods. We retain most of the 252 rms, with a sample of 237 remaining. The change in
average dealer depth is 2.57 during our sample period, which is a 72% increase. The average dealer
depth increases from 9.89 at the end of 2004, to 14.48 at the end of 2005, which is a 46% increase
in depth. The average level of opacity is much more stable in 2004 and 2005, while the liquidity
of the market continues to increase. This is evidence against the argument that  is a proxy for
liquidity. To ensure that the sample we focus on in our study is not inuencing our liquidity test
price of risk is statistically signicant, whereas the TERM factor price of risk is not.
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results, we also look at the change in opacity for all rms we are able to calculate opacity for in 2004
and 2005 (379 rms). The results are in Panel B of Table 7. The pattern is clear; there is a large
increase in dealer depth from 2004 to 2005, but the average level of opacity actually increases by
a small amount. The di¤erence in mean and median opacity is marginally statistically signicant,
but not economically signicant. This is additional evidence that the continued rapid expansion of
the CDS market is not driving the results in our pre- and post-SOX sample period.
TABLE 7
We continue to explore the liquidity argument by looking at the impact of the change in dealer
depth from pre-SOX to post-SOX and from 2004 to 2005. We expect the rms with the largest
increase in dealer depth to experience the largest decline in opacity if a reduction in liquidity premia
is driving the results. Therefore, we separate the rms into two groups based on the change in dealer
depth from the two periods. Panel A shows that the rms with a larger increase in dealer depth
actually had a smaller average decline in opacity. This evidence conicts a liquidity argument for
our results. Panel B displays the results of the same analysis for 2004 and 2005. We calculate
the statistics for both the overlapping sample (237 rms) and the larger sample (379 rms). We
show that for a di¤erent time period and with additional rms in the sample, rms with a larger
increase in liquidity experienced a larger positive change in opacity. This is the opposite direction
from what we would expect if liquidity is driving the opacity measure. Given the time-series and
cross-sectional out-of-sample test results, we argue that a reduction in opacity post-SOX is not
driven by a decline in liquidity premia.
TABLE 8
We also explore an additional microstructure e¤ect that may inuence security prices in Table 8.
One could argue that the July 2002 introduction of TRACE in the corporate bond market and
the associated increase in market transparency is responsible for the reduction of credit spreads
(in excess of traditional spread determinants) we document. Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007)
provide some evidence that credit spreads decrease for bonds whose trading becomes more trans-
parent with TRACE. It is possible that such reduction is transmitted to the CDS market by the
CDS and bond arbitrage relationship (Du¢ e, 1999). We investigate one cross-sectional implication
of this alternative explanation.
The introduction of TRACE was gradual and most rms did not have bonds in the system until
much later than July 2002. This allows us to test whether the e¤ect we document is at least partly
driven by increased transparency in the bond market. We compute the fraction of the post-SOX
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period (August 2002 to December 2003) in which each rm in our sample has bonds on TRACE,
and label this fraction "time in TRACE." For example, time in TRACE is one for companies with
bonds in TRACE since July 2002, 0:5 for companies with bonds rst added to TRACE at the mid-
point of the post-SOX period (April 2002), and 0 if no bonds were added by the end of 2003. Since
our calibration uses spreads throughout the entire post-SOX period, the alternative explanation
examined here implies that there should be a larger reduction in opacity for rms with higher time
in TRACE. The evidence in Panel A of Table 8 shows that this conjecture is not supported by
data. The mean and median decreases in opacity are very close for high and low time in TRACE
rms.
4.3 Ratings and liability structure
The CreditGrades model does not di¤erentiate between types of liabilities nor does it incorporate
non-public information about liabilities available to rating analysts and incorporated in credit
ratings. Perhaps we feed the model an overly coarse measure of liabilities, while the market takes a
much more nuanced look at the liability side of a rms balance sheet. For example, while we ignore
di¤erences between short- and long-term liabilities, these di¤erences may a¤ect CDS spreads and
impact our calibrated opacity parameter. Analogously, since rating agencies have access to non-
public information and incorporate such information in the rating process, it could be the case
that CDS spreads reect not only public balance sheet information but also non-public information
conveyed by credit ratings. If that is the case, our measure of opacity could simply be proxying for
the structure of a rms liabilities and for the special information conveyed by ratings. We examine
this possibility by comparing our opacity parameters across subsamples segmented by credit ratings
and the ratio between short- and long-term liabilities. The results are contained in Table 9.
TABLE 9
The evidence in Table 9 shows that calibrated opacity is actually higher for rms with higher
credit ratings. This contradicts the argument outlined above. Therefore, calibrated opacity is not
capturing information available in credit ratings which is missing from the balance sheet. The
positive relationship between opacity and credit rating could be driven by an endogenous leverage
e¤ect: more opaque rms, recognizing that they are charged relatively higher interest rates on debt,
choose to take on less leverage, and thus tend to have higher credit ratings.
The evidence in Table 9 suggests that the ratio of short-term to total liabilities may contaminate the
calibrated measure of corporate opacity. The test statistics for the equality of means and medians
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show that, in the pre-SOX period, rms with relatively more short maturity debt tend to have
higher calibrated opacity. However, the evidence is weaker in the post-SOX period: the medians of
opacity are very close for rms with low and high ratios of short-term to total liabilities. It may
also be the case that more opaque rms endogenously choose shorter term debt, which could lead
to a reduction of total debt costs over longer time periods. Finally, the last set of results in Table
9 are inconsistent with the maturity composition of debt, explaining away our results. In this test,
we group rms according to the change in the ratio of short-term to total liabilities from the pre-
to the post-SOX periods, and calculate means and medians of the change in calibrated opacity. If
the drop of calibrated opacity were explained by rms lengthening the maturity of their liabilities,
we would expect to see a larger reduction in opacity for rms experiencing a larger decrease in the
ratio of short-term to total liabilities. Our tests do not support this conjecture.
4.4 Multiple regressions
The evidence presented so far is based on univariate sorting procedures. In this subsection, we
address the possibility that some unforeseen interaction between potential explanatory variables
may weaken our interpretation of the univariate results. In Panel A of Table 10, we report results
of multiple regressions of the levels of pre-SOX calibrated opacity. Panel B contains results of
multiple regressions of the changes in calibrated opacity from the pre- to the post-SOX periods.
Explanatory variables are winsorized at 1% in each tail. In addition to the alternative explanatory
variables described in the previous subsections, we include two control variables not explored in
the paper before, volatility of stock returns and market capitalization. Volatility is an important
control variable given Liu and Wysockis (2008) critique that pricing e¤ects attributed to accruals
quality are due to innate business risk rather than accounting quality. We also include the number
of quoting dealers to control for liquidity. Finally, we control for debt-to-equity since leverage choice
is related to the level of opacity. We report the estimates with and without debt-to-equity in the
regressions to gauge the interaction with the other variables. Note that the sample size drops from
252 to 222 because 30 rms do not have all the accounting information needed to compute the
accounting-based proxies of corporate reporting reliability15.
TABLE 10
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 Panel A contain results of a baseline OLS regressions, with and
15We do not report results including the S&P Transparency and Disclosure Index or the Number of Independent
Directors as explanatory variables because their inclusion reduce the sample size from 222 to 174 and 175 respectively.
Results are robust to inclusion of these variables.
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without debt-to-equity. Columns (3) and (4) contain results of Tobit Regressions, while Columns
(5) and (6) contain results of a Censored Least Absolute Deviation (CLAD) Regression (Powell,
1984; Chay and Powell, 2001). These types of regressions are needed because the opacity parameter
is bounded below by 0. With the exception of Discretionary Accruals, the coe¢ cients on nancial
reporting reliability variables have the correct sign in all three regressions. Firms with lower
accrual quality, less conservative earnings, and younger rms tend to have higher calibrated opacity.
Coe¢ cients on these variables are statistically signicant at 5% in the OLS, Tobit, and CLAD
specications. The coe¢ cients on Discretionary Accruals are statistically insignicant in all three
regressions. Note that the magnitude of the coe¢ cients on the nancial reporting quality variables
is reasonably close in the three sets of regressions, alleviating concerns that outliers could be driving
the results. The coe¢ cients on stock return volatility and market capitalization are statistically
insignicant.
Panel B of Table 10 contains results of OLS regressions in Columns (1) and (2) and Median
regressions in Columns (3) and (4). To interpret the sign of the coe¢ cients, recall that a negative
sign means a larger decrease in the opacity parameter following SOX for larger values of the
explanatory variable. In other words, negative signs are associated with "bad" characteristics
from a cost of debt perspective. Conrming the results in the levels specication of Panel A,
the coe¢ cients on accrual quality, rm age, and earnings conservativism have the correct sign
and are statistically signicant at the 5% level. Coe¢ cients on Discretionary Accruals and on
Chhaochharia and Grinsteins (2001) Dummy are not statistically signicant. Finally, as in Panel
A, the coe¢ cients on stock return volatility and market capitalization are statistically insignicant.
4.5 Changes in calibration procedure
In our baseline results we choose a di¤erent expected default boundary L for each industry using
Fama and Frenchs 11-industry classication before we calibrate the corporate opacity  for each
rm-period (see Appendix A for details). In Table B.1 we present an alternative calibration in
which L is constrained to be equal to 0:77 across all industries. This is the single value of L across
all rms that maximizes the number of rm-day spread observations falling within the boundaries
of the CreditGrades model. All our results still hold. Table B.2 contains results of calibration
using L = 12 for all rms. This is the expected default boundary suggested by the CreditGrades
Technical Manual (2002). Most of our results hold in this alternative (worse) calibration. Finally,
Table B.3 uses Ls chosen for each industry of our baseline results, but removing from the sample
the rms in which the calibrated opacity was a corner solution either on the pre-SOX or on the
post-SOX periods. The total sample size drops from 252 to 156: The results are likely to be weaker
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than our baseline ones for two reasons. First, the sample size drops considerably, which reduces
the power of our tests. Second, extreme rms (very opaque or very transparent) likely to contain
a lot of information about the relationship between spreads and opacity are dropped from the
sample. Nonetheless, Table B.3 shows that most of our results still hold in this subsample of
interior solutions only.
5 Conclusion
Following a mounting number of high-prole corporate scandals, the US Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002 in an attempt to restore public trust in US capital markets.
The legislation aims to improve corporate transparency by altering governance, disclosure, internal
control, and auditing practices of publicly traded companies. In this study, we investigate the
impact of such changes on the cost of debt capital.
In order to compute changes in the cost of debt capital due to changes in corporate transparency
after SOX, we use daily CDS spreads and a structural CDS pricing model to calibrate a corporate
opacity parameter for 252 rms in each of the pre-SOX (January 2001 to July 2002) and post-SOX
(August 2002 to December 2003) time periods. First, we show that the opacity parameter is signi-
cantly associated with rm characteristics related to the reliability of corporate reports. Firms with
lower quality accruals, less conservative earnings, a lower number of independent directors, lower
S&P Transparency and Disclosure rating, and younger rms tend to have higher CDS-calibrated
opacity, and consequently higher cost of debt ceteris paribus. Second, we show that corporate opac-
ity parameters tend to be signicantly lower in the post-SOX than in the pre-SOX period. Third,
the decrease in the opacity parameter tends to be larger for rms more likely to be a¤ected by the
new legislation. These rms have lower accrual quality, less conservative earnings, a lower number
of independent directors, lower S&P Transparency and Disclosure rating, and are younger and less
compliant with SOX according to criteria in Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007).
We do not attempt to gauge our calibrated opacity parameter against alternative measures of
corporate transparency or accounting/earnings quality, which may be a fruitful venue for future
research. We argue, however, that our calibrated opacity parameter is uniquely well suited to our
goal of studying the e¤ect of changes in corporate transparency on the cost of debt. Our results
indicate that the passage of SOX is associated with a substantial decline in the cost of debt due
to increased reliability of corporate reports after SOX. We estimate that the reduction of opacity
following SOX implies a 17:7 bp decrease in the 5-year CDS spread of the median rm in our sample.
Furthermore, we document that our results are robust to changes in our calibration procedure, and
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show the data does not support plausible alternative explanations for our ndings.
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Appendix A: Model and Calibration Details
The CreditGrades model (2002) is an adaptation and extension of the Black and Cox (1976) debt
pricing model. Total rm value per equity share is a Geometric Brownian Motion with zero drift
and volatility : Reported liabilities per equity share is constant at D. Default happens the rst
time the value process hits an uncertain default boundary given by LD, where L is lognormally
distributed and independent of the value process Vt. The expected value of L is L, and the standard
deviation of the log of L is : Note that L can be below one: structural models with endogenous
default (e.g. Leland, 1994) show that equity holders may be willing to keep the rm alive even
when the current value of assets is below the face value of debt. If the rm defaults before the
expiration of the CDS contract, the seller of protection stops receiving spread payments and has
to make a lump-sum payment pay of (1   R). Given the assumptions, the CreditGrades manual
(2002) shows that the fair CDS spread is well approximated by the closed-form formula in Section
2.1.
It is important to mention that the credit spread is not a monotonic function of the uncertainty
parameter . Given the other seven inputs of the CDS pricing formula, there is a  such that the
function c(T; ) reaches a maximum spread. This is the only critical point of the function c(T; ):
the function is monotonically increasing for 0 <  < , and monotonically decreasing in  > .
This is an unpleasant feature of the model, and a consequence of simplifying assumptions such as
exogenous recovery. We address this issue by performing a constrained optimization: we minimize
the sum of squared di¤erences between market and model spreads under the constraint that the
calibrated b for a given rm-period has to be in the interval [0; ], where  is the time-series
median value of  for each rm. This implies that there can be corner solutions both on the low
side, when market spreads tend to be below the model spread at  = 0, and on the high side, when
market spreads tend to be above the model spread when  = :
In our baseline results, we rst obtain L for each industry before we calibrate b for each rm-
period. This is because structural models such as Fan and Sundaresan (2000) show that the
default boundary depends on business risk, marginal tax rates, liquidation costs, and the relative
bargaining power between shareholders and debtholders in the event of default; that is, attributes
that display much higher cross-industry than within-industry variation16. Therefore, calibrating a
di¤erent L for each industry is a way to control for industry a¢ liation within the structural pricing
model. Using the Fama-French 11 industry classication, for each industry we choose the L that
maximizes the number of observations in which market spreads are within the range that can be
delivered by the CreditGrades model. This proceeds as follows: for each rm-day observation, we
16Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) use industry concentration, R&D expense ratio, and asset tangibility as proxies
for liquidation costs and shareholder bargaining power.
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compute the  that maximizes the spread (i.e., the critical  mentioned above). Then, for each
rm-day observation grouped by industry, and each value of L from 0 to 1 in 0:01 steps, we compute
the minimum (i.e. at  = 0) and maximum (i.e. at  = ) model-implied spreads. Then, for
each rm-day observation, we check whether the market CDS spread is between the minimum and
maximum model-implied spreads. We add across rm-days observations in the same industry to
nd the value of L that maximizes the number of times that market spreads are within the interval
that can be generated by the model. The chosen values of L are shown in Panel A of Table A.1.
These are the values used in our baseline results. As a robustness check, we repeat all our analysis
using the CreditGrades Manual (2002) recommended value of L = 12 for all rms. We also use
L = 0:77 which is the single value of L that maximizes the number of times we nd a non-boundary
solution across rms.
TABLE A:1
Panel B of Table A.1 shows that using di¤erent Ls per industry increases the number of interior
solutions for the calibrated opacity parameters, which reduces the noise in our remaining empirical
analyses.
Finally, we briey discuss the downside of two alternative methods that calibrate Ls and s jointly
rather than sequentially. First, we could choose L for each industry in order to minimize the sum
of squared di¤erences between market and model spreads. The problem with this approach is
that it e¤ectively gives more weight to high market CDS spread observations. This is undesirable
given that there are substantial di¤erences of average market spreads across rms in the same
industry. Untabulated results show that, due to this bias, this procedure actually reduces rather
than increases the number of interior solutions compared to the single L = 12 case. Alternatively,
we could calibrate a di¤erent L for each rm. The problem here is one of econometric identication:
ceteris paribus, a higher CDS spread could be due to either higher opacity  or higher expected
default boundary L, and we are skeptical about the CreditGradesmodel (or any structural models)
ability to disentangle these two e¤ects across rms in di¤erent industries using CDS data only.
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Figure 1 – Market spreads versus model spreads (medians)                      
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Figure 2–  Calibrated opacity parameter pre- and post-SOX                      
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Table 1 – Sample mean and standard deviation of inputs of the CDS Spread Pricing model.                      
The table reports the cross-sectional means and standard deviations of time-series averages of inputs required by the 
CreditGrades CDS pricing model. The sample has 252 firms. Pre-SOX Period is Jan/2001 to Jul/2002, Post-SOX 
Period is Aug/2002 to Dec/2003. CDS Spread is the 5-year spread expressed in basis points, for contracts with the 
Modified Restructuring clause. Equity Volatility is the annualized 5-year equity volatility forecast at a point in time 
from a GARCH (1, 1) model fitted using daily stock returns in Jan/2001-Sep/2007. Risk-free rate is the 5-year swap 
rate minus 10 basis points. Recovery Rate is the recovery rate in case of default reported by Markit. (1 Minus Leverage) 
is equal to stock price divided by the stock price plus liabilities per share. Number of Time-Series Obs. is the number 
time-series observations used to perform the calibration. 
 
           
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
CDS Spread (bp) 120.2 112.8 112.7 119.3
Equity Volatility 0.330 0.120 0.331 0.118
Risk-free rate 0.049 0.033
Recovery Rate 0.428 0.037 0.411 0.019
One Minus Leverage 0.604 0.192 0.574 0.190
Number of Time-Series Obs. 261 125 350 58
Pre-SOX Period Post-SOX Period
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Table 2– Definition of variables.                      
The table describes the variables used in the analysis. Accruals Quality, Discretionary Accruals, and Earnings 
Conservativism are calculated with up to 10 years of yearly data ending in 2001, as in Francis et al. (2004). 
 
Variable Definition 
Pre-SOX Opacity Corporate opacity parameter λ calibrated using the CreditGrades CDS pricing model and daily CDS spreads in the period of Jan/2001 to Jul/2002. 
Post-SOX Opacity Same as above, in the period of Aug/2002 to Dec/2003. 
2004 and 2005 Opacity Same as above, in the periods of Jan/2004 to Dec/2004 and Jan/2005 to Dec/2005. 
Accruals Quality 
Based on Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) regression relating a firm’s current accruals to lagged, 
current, and future operating cash flows: 
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t Assets
CFO
Assets
CFO
Assets
CFO
Assets
TCA  

  1
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1
10
. 
Accruals quality is (minus) the standard deviation of residuals from the regression above. 
Discretionary Accruals 
Industry and performance-matched absolute abnormal accruals calculated from the cash flow 
statement and using the Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005). Averages of 1999, 2000 and 2001 
values.  
Earnings 
Conservativism 
Based on Basu’s (1997) regression relating a firm’s earnings to its stock returns: 
ttttt RETNEGRETNEGEarn   2110 , where NEGt=1 if RETt<0 and 0 otherwise. 
Conservativism is (β1+ β2)/ β1, normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. 
Number of Independent 
Directors 
Number of independent directors in the Board according to the IRRC database. IRRC defines an 
independent director as director who is neither affiliated nor currently an employee of the 
company. An affiliated director is: a former employee of the company or a majority-owned 
subsidiary, a provider of professional services to the company or its executives, a costumer or 
supplier of the company, a significant shareholder, a director who controls more than 50% of the 
voting power, a family member of an employee, or an employee of an institution that receives 
charitable gifts from the company. 
Firm Age Number of decades a firm’s common equity appears in the CRSP database. 
S&P Transparency and 
Disclosure Rating Transparency and Disclosure Rating of Pattel and Dallas (2002), based on all corporate reports. 
Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein's (2007) 
Dummy 
1 if until Nov/2001 the firm has: restated earnings, or related party transactions, or instances of 
illegal insider trading. 0 otherwise. 
Market Factor Loading Slope of regression of excess stock returns onto CRSP value weighted market excess returns. Daily data in Jan/2001-Jul/2002 or Aug/2002-Dec/2003. 
TERM Factor Loading 
Slope of regression of CDS-implied excess bond returns onto excess returns of portfolio long in 
Merrill Lynch 10-year US Treasury Bond Index and short in 30-day Treasury bond index. Daily 
data in Jan/2001-Jul/2002 or Aug/2002-Dec/2003. 
DEF Factor Loading 
Slope of regression of CDS-implied excess returns onto excess returns of portfolio long in 
Merrill Lynch BBB Corporate Bond Index and short in AAA Corporate Bond Index. Daily data 
in Jan/2001 to Jul/2002 or Aug/2002-Dec/2003. 
Ratio of Short-term to 
Total  Liabilities 
The time-series average of the ratio of current liabilities to total adjusted liabilities, defined as 
total liabilities minus minority interest and deferred taxes. Period is Jan/2001-Jul/2002. 
Credit Rating Time-series median of S&P numerical credit rating (AAA is 10 and D is 1) in Jan/2001-Jul/2002. 
Number 
of Quoting Dealers 
Time-series median of the number of CDS dealers quoting the 5-year CDS spread to Markit for 
the periods: Jan/2001-Jul/2002, Aug/2002-Dec/2003, Jan/2004-Dec/2004, Jan/2005-Dec/2005. 
Time in TRACE Fraction of the Aug/2002-Dec/2003 period in which firm has bonds included in the TRACE reporting system. 
Market capitalization Number of shares outstanding times price of share from the CRSP data as of 12/31/2001. In billions of dollars. 
Stock return volatility Average annualized stock return volatility calculated from daily data in the period of Jan/2001 to Jul/2002. 
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Table 3 – Is the calibrated corporate opacity parameter associated with firm characteristics related to corporate 
reporting reliability?  
The table reports mean and medians of Pre-SOX Opacity parameters. Firms are grouped by characteristics related to 
corporate reporting reliability. The row labeled Difference reports the difference between the mean and median of the 
corporate opacity parameter across firm groups. The figures in italics are two-sided p-values for tests of the null 
hypothesis of no difference in means or medians. P-values are calculated using t-tests with unequal variances for 
difference of means and Fisher exact p-values for difference of medians.  
 
 
Mean
[Std. Error]
Median Mean
[Std. Error]
Median
Low 0.865 0.695 Low 0.742 0.640
(N=115) [0.057] (N=80) [0.067]
High 0.521 0.460 High 0.589 0.472
(N=115) [0.041] (N=111) [0.048]
Diff. -0.344 -0.235 Diff. -0.153 -0.168
p-val <0.000 <0.000 p-val 0.065 0.028
Low 0.633 0.497 Low 0.713 0.535
(N=120) [0.051] (N=65) [0.053]
High 0.687 0.528 High 0.581 0.491
(N=120) [0.052] (N=124) [0.062]
Diff. 0.054 0.031 Diff. -0.132 -0.044
p-val 0.462 0.699 p-val 0.110 0.286
Low 0.730 0.535
(N=103) [0.058]
High 0.590 0.462
(N=104) [0.051]
Diff. -0.140 -0.073
p-val 0.070 0.267
Young 0.778 0.660
(N=125) [0.054]
Old 0.533 0.464
(N=125) [0.042]
Diff. -0.245 -0.196
p-val 0.001 0.011
Pre-SOX Opacity Pre-SOX Opacity
(A) 
Accruals
Quality
(C) 
Earnings 
Conservativism
(B)  
Discretionary
Accruals
(D)  
Firm Age
(F)          
S&P Transp. & 
Discl. 2002 
Ratings 
(E)          
Number of 
Independent 
Directors 
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Table 4 - Corporate opacity parameter before and after the passage of SOX. The table reports the distribution (Panel 
A) and tests statistics for the differences of means and medians (Panel B) between Pre-SOX and Post-SOX opacity 
parameters.  
 
 
Panel A - Sample distribution of Pre-SOX and Post-SOX opacities 
 
N=252 Mean StDev Min 25Pct Median 75Pct Max
Pre-SOX Opacity 0.656 0.558 0 0.252 0.510 0.925 2.400
Post-SOX Opacity 0.450 0.419 0 0.136 0.391 0.636 2.100
 
 
 
 
Panel B - Is the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act associated with a significant reduction in corporate opacity? The 
column labeled Difference reports the difference between the mean and median of the corporate opacity parameter across 
the Pre-SOX and Post-SOX periods. The figures in italics are two-sided p-values for tests of the null hypothesis of no 
difference in means or medians. P-values are calculated using a paired t-test for means and a (paired) Wilcoxon signed-
rank test for medians.  
 
N=252
Pre-SOX
Opacity
Post-SOX
Opacity
Difference
p-val
Mean 0.656 0.450 -0.206 <0.000
St. Err. [0.035] [0.026]
Median 0.510 0.391 -0.117 <0.000
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Table 5 – Is the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act associated with a larger reduction in corporate opacity for firms 
with less reliable corporate reporting before SOX?  
 
The table reports mean and medians of the change in corporate opacity parameters following SOX (Post-SOX minus Pre-
SOX Opacity parameters). Firms are grouped by characteristics related to corporate reporting reliability. The row labeled 
Difference reports the difference between the mean and median of the change in opacity parameter across firm groups. 
The figures in italics are two-sided p-values for tests of the null hypothesis of no difference in means or medians. P-
values are calculated using t-tests with unequal variances for difference of means and Fisher exact p-values for difference 
of medians.  
 
Mean
[Std. Err.]
Median Mean
[Std. Err.]
Median
Low -0.282 -0.166 Low -0.230 -0.137
(N=115) [0.037] (N=80) [0.036]
High -0.157 -0.100 High -0.159 -0.102
(N=115) [0.028] (N=111) [0.030]
Diff. 0.125 0.066 Diff. 0.071 0.035
p-val 0.008 0.035 p-val 0.135 0.242
Low -0.192 -0.112 Low -0.248 -0.144
(N=120) [0.033] (N=65) [0.032]
High -0.221 -0.129 High -0.168 -0.091
(N=120) [0.031] (N=124) [0.036]
Diff. -0.029 -0.017 Diff. 0.080 0.053
p-val 0.513 0.699 p-val 0.098 0.032
Low -0.242 -0.123 No -0.186 -0.100
(N=103) [0.043] (N=189) [0.026]
High -0.175 -0.120 Yes -0.266 -0.199
(N=104) [0.028] (N=63) [0.040]
Diff. 0.067 0.003 Diff. -0.080 -0.099
p-val 0.174 0.890 p-val 0.095 0.041
Young -0.260 -0.168
(N=125) [0.034]
Old -0.149 -0.085
(N=125) [0.027]
Diff. 0.111 0.083
p-val 0.012 0.005
(D)          
Firm Age
(F)          
S&P Transp. & 
Discl. 2002 
Ratings 
(G) 
Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein's 
(2007) Dummy
(A) 
Accruals
Quality
(C) 
Earnings 
Conservativism
(B) 
Discretionary
Accruals
(E)          
Number of 
Independent 
Directors 
Pre-SOX minus Post-SOX Opacity Pre-SOX minus Post-SOX Opacity
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Table 6 – Does corporate opacity capture differences in systematic risk premia not accommodated by the CDS 
Spread pricing model? 
The table reports mean and medians of Pre-SOX Opacity parameters (left column), Post-SOX opacity parameters (middle 
column), and changes in opacity parameters (right column). Firms are grouped according to risk factor loadings. Market 
factor loadings in (A) are calculated using equity returns and are defined in Table 2. Term structure and default factor 
loadings in (B) are calculated using implied bond returns from CDS prices and are defined in Table 2. The row labeled 
Difference reports the difference between the mean and median of the corporate opacity parameter across firm groups. 
The figures in italics are two-sided p-values for tests of the null hypothesis of no difference in means or medians. P-
values are calculated using t-tests with unequal variances for difference of means and Fisher exact p-values for difference 
of medians.  
 
Mean
[St. Err] Median
Mean
[St. Err] Median
Mean
[St. Err] Median
Low 0.679 0.528 Low 0.526 0.425 Low -0.196 -0.101
(N=126) [0.049] (N=126) [0.040] (N=125) [0.033]
High 0.633 0.499 High 0.374 0.321 High -0.216 -0.140
(N=126) [0.051] (N=126) [0.033] (N=125) [0.030]
Diff. -0.046 -0.029 Diff. -0.152 -0.104 Diff. -0.020 -0.039
p-val 0.514 0.529 p-val 0.004 0.059 p-val 0.651 0.166
Low 0.589 0.497 Low 0.457 0.406 Low -0.164 -0.093
(N=125) [0.047] (N=125) [0.038] (N=125) [0.031]
High 0.723 0.549 High 0.444 0.383 High -0.247 -0.135
(N=125) [0.052] (N=125) [0.037] (N=125) [0.031]
Diff. 0.134 0.052 Diff. -0.013 -0.023 Diff. -0.083 -0.042
p-val 0.057 0.529 p-val 0.808 0.706 p-val 0.061 0.257
Low 0.766 0.590 Low 0.542 0.509 Low -0.236 -0.120
(N=125) [0.055] (N=125) [0.035] (N=125) [0.034]
High 0.546 0.475 High 0.360 0.220 High -0.176 -0.117
(N=125) [0.041] (N=125) [0.038] (N=125) [0.028]
Diff. -0.220 -0.115 Diff. -0.182 -0.289 Diff. 0.060 0.003
p-val 0.002 0.101 p-val <0.000 <0.000 p-val 0.177 1.000
Post-SOX Opacity Pre-SOX minus Post-SOX OpacityPre-SOX Opacity
(A) 
Market 
Factor
Loading
(B) 
TERM Factor
Loading
(C) 
DEF Factor
Loading
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Table 7 - Corporate opacity and number of quoting dealers over time. The table reports the mean and median level 
of opacity and number of quoting dealers for the Pre-SOX, Post-SOX, 2004 and 2005 periods. The column labeled 
Difference reports the difference between the mean and median of the corporate opacity parameter and number of quoting 
dealers across the sample periods. The figures in italics are two-sided p-values for tests of the null hypothesis of no 
difference in means or medians. Standard errors are calculated using a paired t-test for means. p-values are calculated 
using (paired) Wilcoxon signed-rank test for medians.  
 
Panel A – Sample including firms in all four periods 
 
N=237
Pre-SOX 
Opacity
Post-SOX 
Opacity Difference
2004 
Opacity
2005 
Opacity Difference
Mean 0.655 0.455 -0.200 0.406 0.428 0.021
St. Err. [0.036] [0.027] [0.022] [0.024] [0.023] [0.011]
Median 0.501 0.392 -0.109 0.359 0.393 0.034
p-val <0.000 0.014
N=237
Pre-SOX 
Number of 
Dealers
Post-SOX 
Number of 
Dealers Difference
2004 
Number of 
Dealers
2005 
Number of 
Dealers Difference
Mean 3.55 6.12 2.57 9.89 14.48 4.59
St. Err. [0.06] [0.15] [0.11] [0.29] [0.36] [0.18]
Median 3.46 5.58 2.12 9.92 15.46 5.54
p-val <0.000 <0.000
 
 
 
Panel B – Sample including firms in 2004 and 2005 period only 
 
N=379 2004 Opacity 2005 Opacity Difference
Mean 0.454 0.474 0.020
St. Err. [0.022] [0.021] [0.011]
Median 0.377 0.412 0.035
p-val 0.004
N=379
2004 Number 
of Dealers
2005 Number 
of Dealers Difference
Mean 7.74 11.52 3.78
St. Err. [0.242] [0.325] [0.145]
Median 5.97 10.55 4.58
p-val <0.000
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Table 8 – Does the number of quoting dealers in the CDS market or the introduction of TRACE explain the 
reduction in the calibrated corporate opacity parameter?  
The table reports mean and medians of the change in opacity parameters. Firms are grouped according to characteristics 
that may be associated with credit spreads changes and are not accounted for in the CreditGrades pricing model. The row 
labeled Difference reports the difference between the mean and median of the corporate opacity parameter across firm 
groups.  
 
Panel A – The panel reports result for the Pre- and Post-SOX sample. The figures in italics are two-sided p-values for 
tests of the null hypothesis of no difference in means or medians. P-values are calculated using t-tests with unequal 
variances for difference of means and Fisher exact p-values for difference of medians.  
 
Mean
[St. Err] Median
Low -0.235 -0.125
(N=126) [0.032]
High -0.176 -0.103
(N=126) [0.030]
Diff. 0.059 0.022
p-val 0.182 0.529
Low -0.202 -0.108
(N=126) [0.034]
High -0.210 -0.120
(N=126) [0.028]
Diff. -0.008 -0.012
p-val 0.847 0.900
Post- Minus Pre-SOX Opacity
(A)           
Change in the 
Number of 
Quoting Dealers 
(B)           
Time
in 
TRACE
 
 
Panel B – The panel reports result for the 2004 and 2005 sample. The figures in italics are two-sided p-values for tests of 
the null hypothesis of no difference in means or medians. P-values are calculated using t-tests with unequal variances for 
difference of means and Fisher exact p-values for difference of medians.  
 
Mean
[St. Err] Median
Low 0.000 0.000
(N=119) [0.018]
High 0.043 0.016
(N=118) [0.014]
Diff. 0.043 0.016
p-val 0.059 0.001
Low 0.003 0.000
(N=190) [0.017]
High 0.037 0.001
(N=189) [0.013]
Diff. 0.034 0.001
p-val 0.124 0.025
2005 Minus 2004 Opacity
(A)              
Change in the 
Number of Quoting 
Dealers: all four 
periods required
(B)              
Change in the 
Number of Quoting 
Dealers: 2004 and 
2005 required
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Table 9 – Does the calibrated corporate opacity parameter reflect publicly available information about capital 
structure not accommodated by the CDS pricing model?  
The table reports means and medians of Pre-SOX Opacity parameters (left column), Post-SOX opacity parameters 
(middle column), and changes in opacity parameters (right column). Firms are grouped according to characteristics that 
may be associated with credit spreads, or credit spread changes, and are not accounted for in the CreditGrades pricing 
model. The row labeled Difference reports the difference between the mean and median of the corporate opacity 
parameter across firm groups. The figures in italics are two-sided p-values for tests of the null hypothesis of no difference 
in means or medians. P-values are calculated using t-tests with unequal variances for difference of means and Fisher 
exact p-values for difference of medians.  
 
 
Mean
[St. Err] Median
Mean
[St. Err] Median
Mean
[St. Err] Median
(A) Low 0.558 0.475 Low 0.389 0.391 Low ∆ -0.184 -0.120
(N=126) [0.041] (N=126) [0.028] (N=126) [0.031]
High 0.754 0.545 High 0.511 0.388 High  ∆ -0.227 -0.113
(N=126) [0.056] (N=126) [0.044] (N=126) [0.032]
Diff. 0.196 0.070 Diff. 0.122 -0.003 Diff. -0.043 0.007
p-val 0.005 0.166 p-val 0.022 1.000 p-val 0.325 0.900
(B) Low 0.594 0.466 Low 0.387 0.340
(N=159) [0.041] (N=159) [0.026]
High 0.763 0.577 High 0.558 0.475
(N=93) [0.064] (N=93) [0.0541]
Diff. 0.169 0.111 Diff. 0.171 0.135
p-val 0.027 0.019 p-val 0.005 0.036
Pre-SOX Opacity Post- Minus Pre-SOXPost-SOX Opacity
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Table 10 – Multiple regression analysis of Hypotheses 1 and 3: what explains levels and changes in levels of the 
corporate opacity parameter?  
 
Panel A - Panel A contains results of OLS, Tobit and Censored Least Absolute Deviations regressions of pre-SOX 
opacity onto explanatory variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticty and based on percentile bootstraps with 1,000 repetitions for the CLAD regression.  
*, **, and *** mean significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Dep. Variable: OLS OLS Tobit Tobit CLAD CLAD
Pre-SOX Opacity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.087 0.308 -0.150 0.308 0.456*** 1.139**
(0.333) (0.344) (0.366) (0.376) (0.056) (0.581)
-8.822*** -7.476*** -9.842*** -8.610*** -9.184*** -6.973***
(1.867) (1.887) (1.988) (1.966) (2.843) (2.554)
-0.122 -0.174 -0.168 -0.240 0.225 -0.407
(0.216) (0.208) (0.247) (0.238) (0.803) (0.320)
-0.086*** -0.082*** -0.094*** -0.089*** -0.095** -0.088*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.048) (0.049)
-0.095*** -0.091*** -0.108*** -0.102*** -0.105*** -0.049
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.034)
0.113 0.200 -0.150 -0.061 0.578 0.471
(0.454) (0.427) (0.500) (0.469) (0.838) (0.826)
0.009 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.009 -0.007
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013)
0.506** 0.476** 0.537** 0.467** 0.573* 0.277
(0.231) (0.219) (0.239) (0.227) (0.310) (0.334)
-0.165 -0.191 -0.163 -0.177 -0.339 -0.110
(0.132) (0.128) (0.144) (0.137) (0.228) (0.212)
-1.266* -0.690 -1.325 -0.998 -1.419 -2.442
(0.762) (0.689) (0.793) (0.811) (1.326) (1.850)
-0.339*** -0.165* -0.259** -0.235 -0.547* -0.411
(0.127) (0.095) (0.116) (0.144) (0.300) (0.407)
-0.339*** -0.165* 0.176*** 0.132*** 0.176*** 0.043
(0.127) (0.095) (0.044) (0.045) (0.062) (0.064)
-0.088** -0.087** -0.096** -0.094** -0.061 -0.092
(0.041) (0.039) (0.044) (0.043) (0.057) (0.057)
-0.117** -0.124* -0.809***
(0.058) (0.065) (0.280)
N 222 222 222 222 222 222
Pseudo-R2 0.3692 0.4174 0.230 0.276 0.223 0.334
Credit rating
Number of Quoting Dealers
Debt-to-Equity
Market Capitalization
Ratio of Short-term to Total 
Liabilities
Market Factor Loading
TERM Factor Loading
DEF Factor Loading
Stock return volatility
Constant
Accruals Quality
Discretionary
Accruals
Earnings Conservativism
Firm Age
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Panel B - Panel B contains results of OLS and Median regressions of the change in opacity parameters following SOX  
onto explanatory variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticty.  *, **, and *** mean significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Dep. Variable: OLS OLS Median Median
Post-SOX minus Pre-SOX Opacity (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.274 -0.006 0.090 -0.138
(0.282) (0.300) (0.265) (0.260)
4.171*** 3.125** 4.354*** 1.104
(1.495) (1.555) (1.405) (1.380)
-0.187 -0.154 -0.011 -0.195
(0.203) (0.200) (0.183) (0.161)
0.100** 0.098** 0.086*** 0.082***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.022) (0.021)
0.051*** 0.043*** 0.034** 0.038**
(0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
0.013 0.031 -0.011 -0.020
(0.052) (0.052) (0.055) (0.051)
-0.370 -0.443 -0.153 -0.045
(0.416) (0.426) (0.319) (0.300)
0.003 0.005 0.000 0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006)
-0.685* -0.688* -0.056 0.056
(-0.396) (-0.393) (0.329) (0.311)
0.158* 0.166* 0.048 0.018
(0.095) (0.094) (0.086) (0.082)
-0.031 -0.556 -0.101 0.071
(0.775) (0.772) (0.842) (0.789)
0.263*** 0.151 0.186 0.096
(0.090) (0.106) (0.133) (0.130)
-0.131 -0.138 -0.117 -0.023
(0.128) (0.123) (0.138) (0.135)
-0.170 -0.461 -0.338 -0.299
(0.607) (0.659) (0.638) (0.610)
0.155* 0.108 0.085 0.042
(0.091) (0.089) (0.098) (0.093)
-0.060** -0.031 -0.035 -0.023
(-0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
-0.030 -0.035 0.006 -0.010
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030)
-0.007 0.000 -0.005 -0.001
(0.015) (0.000) (0.017) (0.033)
0.090*** 0.065*
(0.030) (0.034)
0.039 0.053
(0.042) (0.041)
0.017 0.021 -0.010 0.039
(0.053) (0.050) (0.059) (0.058)
N 222 222 222 222
Pseudo-R2 or R2 0.240 0.279 0.103 0.122
DEF Factor Loading
Constant
Accruals Quality
Discretionary
Accruals
Earnings Conservativism
Firm Age
Chhaochharia & Grinstein Dummy
Stock Return Volatility
Market Capitalization
Change in Ratio of Short-term to 
Total Liabilities
Market Factor Loading
TERM. Factor Loading
Change in Market Factor Loading
Change in TERM Factor Loading
Change in DEF Factor Loading
Change in Number Quoting 
Dealers
Time in TRACE
Credit Rating
Number of Quoting Dealers
Debt-to-Equity
Change in Debt-to-Equity
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Table A.1 – Additional information on calibration results 
 
Panel A – Expected Default Boundary by Fama-French 11 industry classification (Financials are excluded from sample) 
 
 
Expected Default Barrier
Durables Goods 0.37
Energy 0.52
Hi-Tech 1.00
Health 1.00
Manufacturing 0.51
Non-Durable Goods 1.00
Shops 0.95
Telecommunication 0.80
Utilities 0.56
Other 0.80
 
 
 
Panel B – Interior and corner solutions for each of the three calibrations discussed in the paper 
 
L=0.5 L by industry L=0.77
Lower bound pre-SOX period 22 31 37
Upper bound pre-SOX period 72 43 37
Lower bound post-SOX period 35 50 60
Upper bound post-SOX period 30 12 12
Interior solutions 345 368 358
Total calibrations 504 504 504
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Table B.1 – Unique default barrier L=0.77.  
Panels A, B, and C contain results of testing Hypotheses 1,2, and 3 of the paper, now assuming a unique default barrier 
equal to 77% of total adjusted liabilities.  
 
 
Panel A - Are better corporate governance and more accounting transparency associated with lower corporate 
opacity?  
Mean
[Std. Error]
Median Mean
[Std. Error]
Median
Low 0.820 0.732 Low 0.744 0.544
(N=115) [0.061] (N=80) [0.071]
High 0.468 0.358 High 0.563 0.386
(N=115) [0.040] (N=111) [0.053]
Diff. -0.352 -0.374 Diff. -0.181 -0.158
p-val <0.000 0.113 p-val 0.045 0.188
Low 0.571 0.361 Low 0.689 0.500
(N=120) [0.051] (N=65) [0.065]
High 0.661 0.508 High 0.545 0.348
(N=120) [0.054] (N=124) [0.056]
Diff. 0.090 0.147 Diff. -0.144 -0.152
p-val 0.226 0.155 p-val 0.098 0.170
Low 0.688 0.424
(N=103) [0.063]
High 0.546 0.420
(N=104) [0.049]
Diff. -0.142 -0.004
p-val 0.076 1.000
Young 0.757 0.547
(N=125) [0.059]
Old 0.464 0.341
(N=125) [0.042]
Diff. -0.293 -0.206
p-val <0.000 0.002
Pre-SOX OpacityPre-SOX Opacity
(D) Firm Age
(E)          
Number of 
Independent 
Directors 
(C) 
Earnings
Conservativism
(A) 
Accruals
Quality
(B)  
Discretionary
Accruals
(F) S&P 
Transp. & 
Discl. 2002 
Ratings 
 
 
 
Panel B - Is the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act associated with a reduction in corporate opacity?  
 
N=252
Pre-SOX
Opacity
Post-SOX
Opacity
Difference
p-val
Mean 0.612 0.431 -0.181 <0.000
St. Err. [0.036] [0.029]
Median 0.427 0.310 -0.117 <0.000
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Panel C - Is the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act associated with a larger reduction in corporate opacity for less 
transparent firms?  
 
Mean
[Std. Err.]
Median Mean
[Std. Err.]
Median
Low -0.244 -0.137 Low -0.226 -0.138
(N=115) [0.033] (N=80) [0.036]
High -0.142 -0.096 High -0.155 -0.095
(N=115) [0.027] (N=111) [0.031]
Diff. 0.102 0.041 Diff. 0.071 0.043
p-val 0.016 0.187 p-val 0.138 0.381
Low -0.168 -0.103 Low -0.206 -0.058
(N=120) [0.029] (N=65) [0.036]
High -0.194 -0.101 High -0.142 -0.139
(N=120) [0.030] (N=124) [0.032]
Diff. -0.026 0.002 Diff. 0.064 -0.081
p-val 0.516 1.000 p-val 0.148 0.014
Low -0.198 -0.096 No -0.166 -0.093
(N=103) [0.033] (N=189) [0.024]
High -0.165 -0.130 Yes -0.226 -0.150
(N=104) [0.027] (N=63) [0.036]
Diff. 0.033 -0.034 Diff. -0.060 -0.057
p-val 0.474 0.267 p-val 0.170 0.145
Young -0.223 -0.181
(N=125) [0.034]
Old -0.134 -0.077
(N=125) [0.027]
Diff. 0.089 0.104
p-val 0.027 0.005
(C) 
Earnings
Conservativism
(A) 
Accruals
Quality
(D) Firm Age
(D)          
Number of 
Independent 
Directors 
(B) 
Discretionary
Accruals
(E) S&P 
Transp. & 
Discl. 2002 
Ratings 
(F) 
Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein's 
(2007) Dummy
Pre-SOX minus Post-SOX Opacity Pre-SOX minus Post-SOX Opacity
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Table B.2 – Unique default barrier L=0.50 
Panels A, B, and C contain results of testing Hypotheses 1,2, and 3 of the paper, now assuming a unique default barrier 
equal to 50% of total adjusted liabilities.  
 
Panel A - Are better corporate governance and more accounting transparency associated with lower corporate 
opacity?  
 
Mean
[Std. Error]
Median Mean
[Std. Error]
Median
Low 1.138 1.115 Low 1.061 0.998
(N=115) [0.064] (N=80) [0.078]
High 0.732 0.649 High 0.792 0.649
(N=115) [0.050] (N=80) [0.059]
Diff. -0.406 -0.466 Diff. -0.269 -0.349
p-val <0.000 0.008 p-val 0.006 0.057
Low 0.850 0.642 Low 0.994 0.846
(N=120) [0.061] (N=65) [0.078]
High 0.947 0.836 High 0.790 0.620
(N=120) [0.059] (N=124) [0.060]
Diff. 0.097 0.194 Diff. -0.204 -0.226
p-val 0.254 0.014 p-val 0.039 0.047
Low 0.956 0.767
(N=103) [0.066]
High 0.865 0.731
(N=104) [0.061]
Diff. -0.091 -0.036
p-val 0.313 0.782
Young 1.056 1.003
(N=125) [0.059]
Old 0.731 0.551
(N=125) [0.053]
Diff. -0.325 -0.452
p-val <0.000 <0.000
(D) Firm Age
(B)  
Discretionary
Accruals
(F) S&P 
Transp. & 
Discl. 2002 
Ratings 
(E)          
Number of 
Independent 
Directors 
(C) 
Earnings
Conservativism
Pre-SOX OpacityPre-SOX Opacity
(A) 
Accruals
Quality
 
 
Panel B - Is the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act associated with a reduction in corporate opacity?  
 
N=252
Pre-SOX
Opacity
Post-SOX
Opacity
Difference
p-val
Mean 0.893 0.679 -0.214 <0.000
St. Err. [0.041] [0.037]
Median 0.740 0.559 -0.181 <0.000
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Panel C - Is the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act associated with a larger reduction in corporate opacity for less 
transparent firms? 
 
Mean
[Std. Err.]
Median Mean
[Std. Err.]
Median
Low -0.256 -0.148 Low -0.247 -0.189
(N=115) [0.041] (N=80) [0.039]
High -0.184 -0.130 High -0.162 -0.110
(N=115) [0.030] (N=80) [0.035]
Diff. 0.072 0.018 Diff. 0.085 0.079
p-val 0.155 0.792 p-val 0.107 0.242
Low -0.201 -0.120 Low -0.253 -0.186
(N=120) [0.039] (N=65) [0.042]
High -0.225 -0.155 High -0.173 -0.072
(N=120) [0.029] (N=124) [0.035]
Diff. -0.024 -0.035 Diff. 0.080 0.114
p-val 0.624 0.245 p-val 0.143 0.066
Low -0.216 -0.125 No -0.189 -0.117
(N=103) [0.042] (N=189) [0.028]
High -0.212 -0.153 Yes -0.287 -0.207
(N=104) [0.033] (N=63) [0.045]
Diff. 0.004 -0.028 Diff. -0.098 -0.090
p-val 0.934 0.405 p-val 0.070 0.145
Young -0.248 -0.181
(N=125) [0.032]
Old -0.175 -0.105
(N=125) [0.035]
Diff. 0.073 0.076
p-val 0.127 0.312
Pre-SOX minus Post-SOX Opacity Pre-SOX minus Post-SOX Opacity
(G) 
Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein's 
(2007) Dummy
(E)          
Number of 
Independent 
Directors 
(A) 
Accruals
Quality
(D) Firm Age
(B) 
Discretionary
Accruals
(F) S&P 
Transp. & 
Discl. 2002 
Ratings 
(C) 
Earnings
Conservativism
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Table B.3– Only interior solutions 
Panels A, B, and C contain of results of testing Hypotheses 1,2, and 3 of the paper, now discarding firms with corner 
solutions in the calibration process either in the Pre-SOX period or in the Post-SOX one. The sample size drops from 
252 firms to 156 firms accordingly.   
 
Panel A - Are better corporate governance and more accounting transparency associated with lower corporate 
opacity?  
Mean
[Std. Error]
Median Mean
[Std. Error]
Median
Low 0.650 0.574 Low 0.694 0.644
(N=73) [0.041] (N=50) [0.047]
High 0.556 0.513 High 0.541 0.482
(N=74) [0.032] (N=50) [0.043]
Diff. -0.094 -0.061 Diff. -0.153 -0.162
p-val 0.073 0.250 p-val 0.014 0.069
Low 0.603 0.551 Low 0.657 0.549
(N=74) [0.035] (N=44) [0.045]
High 0.593 0.522 High 0.575 0.515
(N=75) [0.039] (N=73) [0.040]
Diff. -0.010 -0.029 Diff. -0.082 -0.034
p-val 0.842 0.414 p-val 0.173 0.449
Low 0.597 0.506
(N=65) [0.040]
High 0.550 0.500
(N=65) [0.037]
Diff. -0.047 -0.006
p-val 0.387 1.000
Young 0.613 0.574
(N=78) [0.034]
Old 0.563 0.494
(N=78) [0.038]
Diff. -0.050 -0.080
p-val 0.334 0.631
(C) 
Earnings
Conservativism
(D) Firm Age
Pre-SOX Opacity Pre-SOX Opacity
(A) 
Accruals
Quality
(E)          
Number of 
Independent 
Directors 
(B)  
Discretionary
Accruals
(F) S&P 
Transp. & 
Discl. 2002 
Ratings 
 
 
Panel B - Is the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act associated with a reduction in corporate opacity?  
 
N=156
Pre-SOX
Opacity
Post-SOX
Opacity
Difference
p-val
Mean 0.588 0.452 -0.136 <0.000
St. Err. [0.026] [0.020]
Median 0.526 0.415 -0.111 <0.000
 
 
 52
Panel C - Is the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act associated with a larger reduction in corporate opacity for less 
transparent firms? 
Mean
[Std. Err.]
Median Mean
[Std. Err.]
Median
Low -0.152 -0.123 Low -0.194 -0.143
(N=73) [0.030] (N=47) [0.034]
High -0.130 -0.101 High -0.118 -0.092
(N=74) [0.023] (N=50) [0.023]
Diff. 0.022 0.022 Diff. 0.076 0.051
p-val 0.561 0.324 p-val 0.071 0.146
Low -0.135 -0.106 Low -0.145 -0.186
(N=74) [0.023] (N=44) [0.038]
High -0.151 -0.107 High -0.165 -0.072
(N=75) [0.028] (N=73) [0.024]
Diff. -0.016 -0.001 Diff. -0.020 0.114
p-val 0.663 1.000 p-val 0.656 0.182
Low -0.140 -0.116 No -0.121 -0.098
(N=65) [0.032] (N=118) [0.021]
High -0.139 -0.107 Yes -0.179 -0.146
(N=65) [0.021] (N=38) [0.034]
Diff. 0.001 0.009 Diff. -0.058 -0.048
p-val 0.991 1.000 p-val 0.157 0.351
Young -0.141 -0.120
(N=78) [0.022]
Old -0.129 -0.102
(N=78) [0.029]
Diff. 0.012 0.018
p-val 0.746 0.873
Pre-SOX minus Post-SOX Opacity Pre-SOX minus Post-SOX Opacity
(A) 
Accruals
Quality
(E)          
Number of 
Independent 
Directors 
(B) 
Discretionary
Accruals
(F) S&P 
Transp. & 
Discl. 2002 
Ratings 
(C) 
Earnings
Conservativism
(G) 
Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein's 
(2007) Dummy
(D) Firm Age
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
